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Abstract 
 
Finding mechanisms to promote the use of face masks is fundamental during the second 
phase of the COVID-19 pandemic response, when shelter-in-place rules are relaxed and some 
segments of the population are allowed to circulate more freely. Here we report three pre-
registered studies (total N = 1,920), using an heterogenous sample of people living in the 
USA, showing that priming people to “rely on their reasoning” rather than to “rely on their 
emotions” significantly increases their intentions to wear a face covering. Compared to the 
baseline, priming reasoning promotes intentions to wear a face covering, whereas priming 
emotion has no significant effect. These findings have theoretical and practical implications. 
Practically, they offer a simple and scalable intervention to promote intentions to wear a face 
mask. Theoretically, they shed light on the cognitive basis of intentions to wear a face 
covering.  
Introduction 
 
The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic is one of the greatest health threats of the last 
century. At the time of writing (June 11, 2020), over 7 millions of people have been tested 
positive and over 400,000 are confirmed dead1 – and probably these are substantial 
underestimations (Burn-Murdoch, Romei, & Giles, 2020).  
 
The large impact of COVID-19 is partly due to the fact that it can be transmitted by 
asymptomatic people, who often are not aware of being infected, through a cough or a sneeze 
(Bai et al. 2020; Mizumoto et al. 2020; Nishiura et al. 2020). For this reason, epidemiologists 
and health experts have recommended that people use face coverings, with the aim of 
minimizing the number of infected droplets that asymptomatic people spread around with the 
risk of infecting others. In line with these experts’ suggestions, a study based in Germany 
found that the use of face mask reduced the daily growth rate of reported infections by about 
40% (Mitze et al. 2020), whereas a study based in Beijing, China, exploring transmission in 
families with at least one laboratory confirmed COVID-19 case found that “face mask use by 
the primary case and family contacts before the primary case developed symptoms was 79% 
effective in reducing transmission” (Wang et al. 2020). 
 
Yet, since wearing a face covering represents a significant change in people’s habitual 
behaviour, we might expect that people would be reluctant to wear one. It follows that 
developing mechanisms that favour the use of face masks is crucial to slow down COVID-19 
transmission and “flatten the curve” of the spread. Several national or local governments have 
taken the hard decision of making the use of face coverings mandatory in several contexts 
(Javid, 2020). However, since it is impossible to monitor the behavior of every person, even 
in places where wearing a face covering is mandatory, explicit laws should be complemented 
by implicit behavioral “nudges” aimed at directing people’s behavior towards the desired 
one. In particular, appeals and messages can be very effective at promoting desired 
behavioral changes, because they can reach people inside their homes, through television and 
social media, as well as outside their homes, through screens, posters, and megaphones. This 
raises an important question. Which types of messages are most effective in promoting the 
use of face coverings?  
 
Little is known about this question. Several papers have explored the effect of appeals and 
messages on intentions to engage in COVID-19 preventive behaviours (Barari et al. 2020; 
Bilancini et al. 2020; Capraro & Barcelo, 2020; Everett et al. 2020; Falco & Zaccagni, 2020; 
Heffner et al. 2020; Jordan et al. 2020; Lunn et al. 2020; Pfattheicher et al. 2020). However, 
with the exception of one paper, none of these works explored the effect of messages on 
intentions to wear a face covering; the only exception is Capraro and Barcelo (2020), which 
found that telling subjects that the coronavirus (COVID-19) is a threat to their community 
increases intentions to wear a face covering, relative to the baseline. This paper also showed a 
correlation such that people who feel negative emotions when wearing a face covering are 
less likely to self-report that they intend to wear a face covering. This suggests that 
deactivating the emotional cognitive system by asking people to rely on their reasoning, 
rather than on emotions, might be an effective tool to increase intentions to wear a face 
covering. So here we ask the following research question: Does priming people to rely on 
their reasoning, rather than to rely on their emotions, promote their intentions to use a face 
covering? 
 
1 https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ 
 
This is obviously an important practical question: if it turns true, it would offer a simple 
scalable intervention to promote intentions to wear a face covering. But it is also an 
interesting theoretical question. According to dual-process theory, people’s decisions result 
from the interplay between two cognitive processes, one that is fast, effortless and intuitive 
(named System 1) and one that is slow, effortful and deliberative (named System 2). (Fodor, 
1983; Schneider & Schiffrin, 1977; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Reber, 
1993; Sloman, 1996; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Kahneman, 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; De Neys & Pennycook, 2019). The dual-process approach has been shown useful to 
study people’s decisions in several domains, including cooperation (Rand, 2016; Kvarven et 
al. 2020), altruism (Rand et al. 2016; Fromell et al. 2020), honesty (Köbis et al. 2019), 
reciprocity (Halsson et al. 2018), morality (Greene et al. 2008), and human-animal 
relationships (Caviola & Capraro, 2020). See Capraro (2019) for a detailed review. Emotion 
and reason are considered to be two “typical correlates” of System 1 and System 2, 
respectively (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Therefore, exploring whether priming emotion vs. 
reason affects people’s intentions to wear a face covering would allow us to shed light on the 
cognitive basis of intentions to wear a face mask. 
 
In this paper, we report three pre-registered experiments (total N=1,920). The experiments 
have been conducted on a heterogeneous, although not representative, sample of people 
living in the USA and surveyed using Amazon Mechanical Turk (Paolacci, Chandler, & 
Ipeirotis, 2010). We found that priming people to rely on their reasoning increases intentions 
to wear a face covering relative to the “symmetric” priming, according to which people are 
primed to rely on their emotions. Comparing the primes to the baseline, we find that the 
effect is primarily driven by reasoning, meaning that, compared to the baseline, priming 
reasoning significantly increases intentions to wear a face covering, whereas priming 
emotions do not significantly change intentions to wear a face covering.  
 
Study 1 
 
Method 
 
Conditions 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: in the priming emotion 
condition, they were shown a message highlighting the positive consequences of making 
decisions based on feelings; in the priming reasoning condition, they were shown a message 
highlighting the positive consequences of making decisions based on reasoning. These primes 
were taken from previously published work (Levine et al. 2018; Capraro, Everett & Earp, 
2019; Caviola & Capraro, 2020). See Table 1 for the exact primes. 
 
Condition Message 
Priming emotion Sometimes people make decisions by using 
feelings and relying on their emotions. 
Other times, people make decisions by 
using logic and relying on their reasoning. 
Many people believe that emotions lead to 
good decision-making. When we use 
feelings, rather than logic, we make 
emotionally satisfying decisions. Please 
answer the following questions by relying 
on emotions, rather than reasoning. 
Priming reason Sometimes people make decisions by using 
logic and relying on their reasoning. Other 
times, people make decisions by using 
feelings and relying on their emotions. 
Many people believe that reason leads to 
good decision-making. When we use logic, 
rather than feelings, we make rationally 
satisfying decisions. Please answer the 
following questions by relying on 
reasoning, rather than emotions. 
 
Table 1. Conditions of the experiment. Between-subjects random assignment. 
 
Dependent variables 
 
After reading the prime, all participants took the following scale.  
 
Intentions to wear a face covering. Participants were asked to: “answer the following 
questions by relying on emotions [reasoning]. When the shelter-in-place rules are 
relaxed, I intend to ... 
a. Wear a face covering any time I leave home. 
b. Wear a face covering any time I am engaged in essential activities and/or 
work, and there is no substitute for physical distancing and staying at home. 
c. Wear a face covering any time I'm around people outside my household.” 
 
All answers were collected using a 10-line “snap to grid” slider with three labels: “strongly 
disagree” at the extreme left, “neither agree nor disagree” at the center, “strongly agree” at 
the extreme right.  
 
Demographics 
 
After the scale, participants were asked the following set of demographic questions: sex, age, 
race, political views, religiosity, whether they live in an urban area, whether wearing a face 
covering is mandatory in their county, whether there live in an area where shelter-in-place 
rules apply, whether they were tested positive, whether they believe they will get the 
coronavirus and, if so, whether they believe they will get over it relatively easily”. At the end, 
there was a control question to get rid of potential bots.  
 
Pre-registration 
 
The design and the analyses were pre-registered at: https://aspredicted.org/h3x5d.pdf. 
  
Results 
 
Demographic characteristics of the sample 
 
As pre-registered, we eliminated from the analysis subjects who did not pass the attention 
check and, for each multiple IP address or Turk ID, we keep only the first observation and 
discarded the rest. This corresponds to deleting about 2% of the observations. Our main 
results remain qualitatively the same when including these observations. We report in Table 
A1 the demographic characteristics of the sample for this and the following studies. We note 
that the sample is quite heterogeneous, although not representative: males and females are 
equally represented; the age group 25-54 is overrepresented, whereas the age groups 18-24 
and 65+ are underrepresented; Whites are overrepresented, while Blacks or African 
Americans are underrepresented.2 The average participant is more left-leaning than the 
average American.3 The sample is representative of people living in urban areas.4 We could 
not find information about the exact percentage of counties where wearing a face covering 
was mandatory and about the percentage of counties where shelter-in-place rules applies; in 
Table A1 we report also these percentages for completeness. 
 
The effect of priming emotion vs. reasoning on intentions to wear a face covering 
 
We first build the composite variable “intentions to wear a face covering”, by taking the 
average of its three items (aemotion = 0.932, areason = 0.924). Wilcoxon rank-sum shows that 
the distribution of intentions to wear a face covering when reasoning is primed is statistically 
different from the one when emotion is primed (z = 2.366, p = 0.018). Looking at the 
averages, promoting reasoning appears to increase intentions to wear a face covering relative 
to priming emotion (Mreason = 7.38, SDreason = 3.00; Memotion = 6.61, SDemotion = 3.24).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Intentions to wear a face covering split by treatment; y-axis from 0 to 10. Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
 
 
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_United_States 
3 https://news.gallup.com/poll/275792/remained-center-right-ideologically-2019.aspx 
4 https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-210.html 
Study 2 
 
Study 1 shows that priming reasoning vs emotion promotes intentions to wear a face 
covering. However, it is not clear whether it is priming reasoning that promotes intentions to 
wear a face covering, or it is priming emotion that undermines intentions to wear a face 
covering, or both. To answer this question, in Study 2 we repeat the experiment by adding a 
baseline condition. Apart from answering our main question, this would also be an occasion 
to replicate the results of Study 1 (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). 
 
Method 
 
Conditions 
 
Study 2 is identical to Study 1 with the only difference that we added the baseline, so that 
participants in Study 2 are randomly divided in three conditions: priming emotion, baseline, 
and priming reasoning. 
 
Pre-registration 
 
The design, the analyses, and the sample size were pre-registered at: 
https://aspredicted.org/bq9v6.pdf. 
  
Results 
 
Demographic characteristics of the sample 
 
People who participated in the previous study, as well as those who participated in the study 
reported in Capraro & Barcelo (2020), have not been allowed to participate in this study. The 
demographic characteristics of the sample are reported in Appendix, Table A1. 
 
The effect of priming emotion vs reason on intentions to wear a face covering 
 
We first build the composite variable “intentions to wear a face covering”, by taking the 
average of its three items (aemotion = 0.914, abaseline = 0.937, areason = 0.941). A one-way 
ANOVA with Bonferroni correction5 reveals that there were not statistically significant 
differences across conditions (F(2,588) = 0.31, p = 0.731). See Figure 2. 
 
 
5 We pre-registered that we would use pairwise rank-sum, but then we realized that a one-way ANOVA with 
Bonferroni correction would be the correct test to be used in this case. In any case, we note that the pairwise 
rank-sum tests, after Bonferroni correction, give qualitatively the same results as the post-hoc tests of the 
ANOVA. 
 
Figure 2. Intentions to wear a face covering split by treatment in Study 2; y-axis from 0 to 10. 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Study 3 
 
Study 2 finds a non-significant trend in the same direction as Study 1. One possibility is that 
Study 1 was a false positive. Another possibility is that Study 2 failed to find an effect for 
some reasons (e.g., Study 2 was conducted the Monday after the protests against George 
Floyd’s death, and this might have pushed some people to make decisions using their 
emotion, thus diminishing the effect of reasoning). To clarify this, we conducted a third study 
with a larger sample size sufficient to detect a small effect of d = 0.20 with power 0.80 and 
alpha = 0.05.  
 
Method 
 
Conditions 
 
Study 3 is identical to Study 2. 
 
Pre-registration 
 
The design, the analyses, and the sample size were pre-registered at: 
https://aspredicted.org/qb5y8.pdf. 
 
Results 
 
Demographic characteristics of the sample 
 
People who participated in the previous two studies, as well as those who participated in the 
study reported in Capraro & Barcelo (2020), have not been allowed to participate in this 
study. The demographic characteristics of the sample are reported in the Appendix, Table A1. 
 
The effect of priming emotion vs reason on intentions to wear a face covering 
 
We first build the composite variable “intentions to wear a face covering”, by taking the 
average of its three items (aemotion = 0.933, abaseline = 0.941, areason = 0.928). A one-way 
ANOVA with Bonferroni correction reveals a statistically significant effect of condition on 
intentions to wear a face covering (F(2,927) = 7.35, p < 0.001). Post-hoc comparisons show 
that intentions to wear a face covering when reasoning is primed (M = 7.23, SD = 2.97) are 
significantly higher than intentions to wear a face covering when emotion is primed (M = 
6.29, SD = 3.10), p < .001. On the other hand, intentions to wear a face covering in the 
baseline (M = 6.71, SD = 3.22) does not appear to be significantly different than the other two 
conditions (both p’s > 0.12). See Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Intentions to wear a face covering split by treatment in Study 3; y-axis from 0 to 10. 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. Note that the errors do not take into 
account Bonferroni correction. 
 
 
All studies together 
 
As pre-registered in Study 3, we now put all the data together to increase the power and test 
which of the three effects are significant with a larger sample size. A one-way ANOVA with 
Bonferroni correction confirms the statistically significant effect of condition (F(2,1917) = 
9.17, p < .001). Post-hoc comparisons reveal that intentions to wear a face covering are 
higher in the priming reason condition (M = 7.18, SD = 3.09) compared to the priming 
emotion condition (M = 6.48, SD = 3.12), p < .001, whereas intentions to wear a face 
covering in the baseline (M = 6.71, SD = 3.21) lays between the two other conditions, but it is 
significantly different from the priming reason condition (p = .033) but not from the priming 
emotion condition (p = 0.614). See Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Intentions to wear a face covering split by treatment, all studies together; y-axis 
from 0 to 10. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. Note that the errors do not 
take into account Bonferroni correction. 
 
 
Exploratory analysis looking at potential moderators of the effect 
 
As exploratory analysis, we add each demographic variable as a separated moderator, in 
order to test whether the effect of the treatment is particularly strong on a subset of 
participants. In doing so, we find no significant moderation (sex: p = 0.896, age: p = 0.430; 
race: p = 0.602; political views: p = 0.164; religiosity: p = 0.735; living in urban area: p = 
0.104; living in a county where wearing a face covering is mandatory: p = 0.239; living in a 
county where there are shelter-in-place rules: p = 0.262; tested positive: p = 0.865; tested 
negative: p = 0.594). This suggests that the effect of priming reason vs. emotion is relatively 
stable across subsets of the population.  
 
Discussion 
 
Here we reported three pre-registered studies exploring the effect of priming emotion vs 
reasoning on intentions to wear a face covering. Altogether, these studies show that priming 
reasoning increases intentions to wear a face covering relative to priming emotions. 
Compared to the baseline, priming reasoning increases intentions to wear a face covering, 
whereas priming emotion has no effect on intentions to wear a face covering. The latter 
finding should be taken with caution, because the data trend in the direction that priming 
emotion decreases intentions to wear a face covering, compared to baseline. Therefore, it is 
possible that we failed to detect the effect of priming emotion vs. baseline because of 
insufficient statistical power. 
 
These results have practical and theoretical implications. From a practical perspective, 
finding ways to promote the use of face masks is key during the second phase of the COVID-
19 pandemic response, in which, after the initial strict lockdown, local and national 
governments are relaxing shelter-in-place rules, so that some segments of the population are 
allowed to circulate more freely. Since some of these people will be positive to COVID-19 
without being aware of it, wearing a face mask helps to decrease the probability that infected 
droplets are spread around and infect other people. In this light, our results suggest a simple 
and scalable intervention to promote intentions to use face masks: priming people to rely on 
their reasoning. Of course, our results have some limitations. One regards the sample. Our 
results were obtained with a heterogeneous, but not representative, sample of people living in 
the US. However, we included each demographic variable as a potential moderator into 
separate regression models. In doing so, we found that none of the demographic variables 
moderated the effect of the primes on intentions to wear a face covering. This provides a 
piece of evidence that our results can be generalized to the American population at large. Of 
course, our results cannot be readily generalized to other countries. Future work should test 
the effect of conceptual primes on intentions to wear a face mask in different countries. A 
major limitation of our study is instead the fact that it focuses on intentions, rather than actual 
behavior. A recent study found that intentions to practice physical distancing is correlated to 
actual behavior (Gollwitzer et al. 2020). Although this certainly does not imply that 
intentions to wear a face covering correlate with actual behavior, it does give some hope that 
it will actually be the case. Future work should test whether conceptual primes of the form 
used in this paper impact people’s actual use of face coverings. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, our results suggest that intentions to wear a face covering are 
affected by the cognitive system that is primarily active during the decision-making process. 
This because relying on emotions is typically correlated with System 1 processing, whereas 
relying on reasoning is typically correlated with System 2 processing (Evans & Stanovich, 
2020). This suggests other potential techniques to promote the use of face coverings tapping 
to the same cognitive processes. Indeed, conceptual primes of emotion and reason are not the 
only experimental techniques used to activate System 1 and System 2 respectively. Other 
techniques include time constraints, ego depletion and cognitive load (see Capraro, 2019, for 
a review). It is possible that some of these techniques could be even more effective at 
promoting the use of face masks than conceptual primes. Future work could therefore test 
which cognitive manipulations work best at promoting the use of face masks.  
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Appendix 
 
Demographic characteristics of the sample 
 
Demographic Percent 
 Study 1 
(N=399) 
Study 2 
(N=591) 
Study 3 
(N=930) 
All studies 
(N=1,920) 
gender female 50.63 50.59 51.29 50.93 
male 48.62 49.24 48.38 48.70 
prefer not to 
say 
0.75 0.17 0.32 0.37 
age 18-24 9.27 7.95 6.77 7.65 
25-34 34.59 35.70 40.32 37.71 
35-44 27.32 29.27 25.37 26.98 
45-54 14.04 16.92 14.30 15.05 
55-64 9.77 6.93 8.82 8.43 
65+ 4.51 3.21 4.41 4.11 
race American 
Indian or 
Alaska 
native 
1.00 0.51 0.97 0.83 
Asian 11.02 8.13 9.82 9.56 
Black or 
African 
American 
6.77 7.11 9.06 7.99 
Native 
Hawaiian or 
other Pacific 
Islander 
0 0 0 0 
White 77.19 80.33 75.72 77.49 
Multiracial 3.76 3.89 4.42 4.13 
political view left-leaning 47.61 46.36 46.01 46.67 
center 25.56 23.18 25.53 24.79 
right-
leaning 
26.82 29.61 29.46 28.54 
living in an urban or 
suburban area 
81.70 78.17 78.04 78.84 
living in a county where 
wearing a face covering is 
mandatory 
49.12 45.01 44.40 45.57 
living in a county where there 
are shelter in place rules 
64.16 56.51 50.21 55.05 
 
Table A1. Demographic characteristics of the overall sample. Political view goes from 1 = 
“very left-leaning” to 7 = “very right-leaning”, with 4 = “center”. In the Table we classified 
as “center” only those subjects who answered “center”.  
